The Turtle Tank Evolves

In a recent article/video we looked at the proliferation of Russia’s unusual ‘Turtle Tanks’ which are protected by ad hoc, locally fabricated counter-FPV shells. Since then we’ve gotten a good look at several more Turtle Tanks and our first look at the driver’s point of view.

Footage, filmed on 27 April, of another Russian armoured assault into Krasnohorivka shows a column of four infantry fighting vehicles with what appear t o be counter-FPV shelters following a tank with a ‘cope cage’

On the 29 April, a Ukrainian Telegram channel posted a short video of a ‘Turtle Tank’ attack in the Bakhmut direction, noting that [machine translated]: “the equipment is stupidly scalded with metal, from 5 units it was possible to destroy a tank and an armored personnel carrier. A lot of FPV was spent on one tank. Everyone laughs at their construction of barns, but in fact they work like hell.” The tank appears to have a box like shelter with a sloped forward roof over its gun and glacis. As seen in earlier videos the tank is leading a column of armoured vehicles during the assault, clearing a path for them. It appears to detonate a mine with its mine plough and retreats.

At the start of May a pair of T-62s with hybrid counter-FPV shelters were seen in photos taken by a UAV, location unconfirmed. These images illustrate the blurring of the lines between ‘cope cage’ equipped tanks and the ‘turtle tanks’. Like the earlier turtle tanks they’re fitted with EW sets & KMT-6 mine ploughs but do not have shells made entirely from sheet metal. Instead, they appear to have used chainlink and gratings, one piece of which appears to have Kontakt (explosive reactive armour (ERA) mounted. One of the vehicles appears to have been used to transport supplies. One T-62 has broken tracks, the other top damage.

*A hybrid combining elements of the Turtle Tank with that of earlier ‘cope cages’ (via social media)*

Around the same time the Ukrainian 79th Air Assault Brigade shared video of Russian attacks near Novomykhailivka, in Donetsk, the footage included a brief clip of a ‘turtle tank’ with a small forward opening, camouflage over its shell frame and no sign of a mine plough or roller fitted. On 2 May, the 33rd Mechanized Brigade shared footage from thermal camera-equipped FPV drones showed a Russian tank being used to transport troops, the profile of the counter-FPV shelter is visible but the low definition of the thermal footage makes it difficult to analyse its construction. The vehicle, however, appears to be equipped with a mine plough and possibly an EW module.

Also on 2 May, Ukrainian drone fundraiser Teoyaomiquu shared a video of a Russian assault near Ivanivske which shows a pair of Russian armoured vehicles with counter-FPV shells, one of which deploys a smoke screen. The 1st Assault Battalion of the 5th Separate Assault Brigade also shared footage from the Russian assault showing the shell-equipped vehicles.

On the 5 May a short video was posted by a Russian combatant which showed an entirely enclosed MT-LB with steel plates surrounding the top of the vehicle and its wheels. It also has an additional mesh roof cover to add additional top protection. Two cutouts in the side and one in the front for the driver also have mesh covers to give some visibility. On the same day video of a destroyed BTR-MDM which had been encased in a counter-FPV shelter was shared, showing the rear of the vehicle enclosed.

*An evolved Turtle Tank with added cages on its superstructure (via social media)*

Perhaps the most striking evolution of the ‘Turtle Tank’ appeared on 5 May, a tank completely enclosed except for a small gap at the front. Protective grills made from cages completely cover the outer metal sheets of the counter-FPV shell. One Russian telegram channel likened it to a rolling ‘poultry farm’. The vehicle also has a KMT-7 mine roller. Additional video of the porcupine-like tank gives us the first look at what it is like driving one of these ‘turtle tanks’, with his hatch open the driver has an almost clear view ahead (apart from the solid awning above him and the partial grill cage protection to his front) but no view to the left or right front quarters of the tank.

*A Turtle Tank driver using a camera feed to steer (via social media)*

Several days later footage from inside what appears to be the same tank shows the driver steering by video monitor. The readout on the monitor suggests the video’s resolution is 4K H.265 but the field of view appears limited, with the camera seemingly positioned on the shell’s awning looking down between the KMT-7’s two rollers. The system used is from Russian automotive accessory company Eplutus and appears to be one of their rear view camera monitors.

Another piece of UAV footage shows another ‘turtle tank’ with a much boxier shell. It again has all of the major features seen in earlier examples: a sheet metal shell which encloses most of the top part of tank, a set of mine rollers and a EW jammer module on the roof. Some sources suggest the footage was filmed near Bilohorivka, in Luhansk. It’s unclear when the footage was filmed but the vehicle appears stationary with access grates to the tank’s rear deck left open.

The 7 May saw evidence of the proliferation of t he ‘turtle tank’ concept with Russian social media sharing photographs of a ‘Turtle Tank’ fabricated by the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, these indicate that the concept is continuing to proliferated, perhaps without any central influence. The tank is encased in a counter-FPV shelter made up of three large metal sheets, a poorly fabricated angled roof which slopes at the rear with a flat top and a wire mesh slopping front piece. Additionally on the floor there appears to be a chair curtain similar to those seen on other ‘turtle tanks’. The rear has an extended deck and appears to be enclosed. A skirt of Kontakt-1 ERA has been roughly added around the skirt. As with other Turtle Tanks the ‘V Turtle’ is equipped with what appears to be an RP-377 electronic warfare jammer. It also has a KMT-6 mine plough fitted. A large white V has been painted on the sides of the shell and Russian flag rings added to the barrel.

*A Turtle Tank built by the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (via social media)*

On 10 May, footage of an FPV drone attacking an immobilised ‘turtle tank’ emerged. The tank is again enclosed by a counter-FPV shell and has a mine plough. The feed from the drone also suffers from some interference as it approaches the vehicle suggesting that an EW module may be present nearby, perhaps aboard the tank. However, it appears that a mine has damaged the tank’s tracks and the vehicle has been abandoned allowing an FPV to attack via an open rear hatch. The footage was reportedly filmed during the first day of the new Russian offensive towards Kharkiv. This again shows that not only is the concept proliferating but also that the ‘turtle tanks’ are still vulnerable to conventional anti-tank weapons like mines.

Also on the 10 May, the Russian military channel, Large Caliber Trouble, shared a photo of the porcupine turtle tank which had been damaged by FPV strikes showing the cage bars bent and some holes in the counter-FPV shell. The post claims that the tank was “attacked by 40 kamikazes, [but] thanks to electronic warfare, most of them fell and only 8 FPVs were able to cause damage.” The condition of the vehicle after the engagement is unknown. The suggestion that a large number of FPVs attacked the tank supports the earlier Ukrainian comments about ‘a lot of FPV [being] spent on one tank.’

*A ‘turtle tank’ seen on the eastern front on the first day of the Russian Kharkiv offensive (via social media)*

A key question is how can the Turtle Tanks be defeated? Basically just like any other tank can be: anti-tank guided missiles with tandem warheads, dense mines belts, direct hits by artillery, use of multiple FPV drones to damage and breach the shell with additional drones to exploit gaps made.

We will probably see further proliferation of the ‘turtle tanks’ in coming weeks but with time the Ukrainians will probably find ways to engage these protected tanks more effectively, as is so common in war there will probably be a continued evolution of measure and counter-measure.

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US Transfers Seized Iranian Small Arms to Ukraine

The U.S. government announced, on 9 April, the transfer of enough small arms to equip a brigade to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The weapons originate from the arms shipments that the US Navy and allies have seized in recent years thousands of weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition which have been seized in recent years from Iranian shipments to the Houthis in Yemen.

*Thousands of illicit weapons interdicted by USS Monterey, May 2021 (U.S. Navy)*

In a statement U.S. Central Command noted that the arms and munitions had been “originally seized by U.S. Central Command and partner naval forces from four separate transiting stateless vessels between 22 May 2021 to 15 Feb 2023.” The transfer to Ukraine includes 5,000 AK-pattern rifles, RPG-7 rocket launchers, sniper rifles and machine guns. This is not the first transfer of seized small arms to Ukraine with a previous transfer occurring in October 2023, when 1.1 million rounds of an unspecified 7.62mm calibre ammunition were transferred. That transfer was made up of ammunition seized from a single dhow on 9 December, 2022.

*On Jan. 7. U.S. Navy seized 2,116 AK-pattern rifles including AKS20U* & *Type 56-1s from a fishing vessel en route from Iran to Yemen. (U.S. Navy)*

On 6 July 2023, the U.S. Justice Department filed a forfeiture action for: “over 9,000 rifles, 284 machine guns, approximately 194 rocket launchers, over 70 anti-tank guided missiles and over 700,000 rounds of ammunition” these were reported to have originated from two dhows in 2021 and two from 2023. This suggests a discrepancy in the number of seized weapons detailed by the forfeiture action and the number subsequently handed over to Ukraine. This perhaps suggests that either a further transfer will follow with the remainder or a substantial portion of the arms and ammunition were not suitable for transfer for some unknown reason.

In terms of the types of small arms being transferred we can get a pretty good idea from examining the previously released images of the arms seized over the last couple of years. These include:

Chinese Type 56-1 7.62x39mm AKs
Russian VEPR AKS20U [VPO-158N-06] in 5.45x39mm (these will likely be useful for support troops and vehicle crews)
PK-pattern general purpose machine guns or Iranian and Chinese origin
Russian Kornet and Iranian Dehlaviyeh anti-tank guided missiles
Chinese Type 69 and Iranian RPG-7 clones
Iranian AM-50 12.7x99mm anti-materiel rifles
Chinese SVD clones
Imagery of seized ammunition suggests 7.62x54mmR, 7.62x39mm, and 12.7x99mm

US Central Command noted that:

“The munitions were being transferred from the IRGC to the Houthis in Yemen in violation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216. U.S. CENTCOM is committed to working with our allies and partners to counter the flow of Iranian lethal aid in the region by all lawful means including U.S. and U.N. sanctions and through interdictions.”

The U.S. Justice Department confirmed in a statement that the transfer took place on 4 April, also explaining that the transfer required a civil forfeiture ruling against seized arms and ammunition which enabled the hand over. Attorney General Merrick B. Garland said: “The Justice Department will continue to use our legal authorities, including forfeiture, to support the Ukrainian people in their fight.”

*French naval forces interdicted more than 3,000 rifles and 578,000 rounds of ammunition, Jan. 2023 (US CENTCOM)*

Most recently, in February 2023, the U.S. Navy reported that “more than 5,000 weapons and 1.6 million rounds of ammunition” had been seized since the beginning of the year. In 2021 alone, approximately 9,000 weapons were intercepted on their way to the Houthis. This suggests that if the weapons have not already been disposed of then there a further stocks of seized weapons to draw on for transfers to Ukraine. It remains to be seen if and when further transfers of seized weapons will be made and when the transferred weapons will begin to be spotted in the field.

Spanish CETME-Ls in Ukraine

In late August 2023, a surprising weapon turned up in Ukraine. It appears that Spain provided Ukraine with an unknown number of 5.56x45mm CETME-L rifles. The rifles were spotted during a parade in Kyiv with an entire company of Ukrainian Border Guards seen equipped with the rifles. I’ve delayed writing this article/video in anticipation of them appearing again but there’s been no sign of the CETME-Ls since the parade.

The parade, held on 23 August 2023, in Kyiv’s Sofia Square celebrated the 32nd anniversary of Ukrainian independence and saw at least 25 members of Ukraine’s Border Guards parade with the rifles. The personnel are believed to have been part of either the 8th or the 9th border detachments who are assigned to the Belarusian border region.

*Ukrainian Border Guards with CETME-Ls, August 2023 (DPSU)*

Spain developed the CETME-L in the early 1980s, to replace the CETME Model C. Entering service in 1986, it uses a roller-delayed gas blowback, check out our earlier video disassembling a CETME-L here. Issues with quality control during manufacturing and quirks of the design led to the Spanish military seeking to replace the CETME-L by the mid 1990s. The HK G36E was selected but the L remains in limited service with significant quantities held in storage.

Ukrainian troops training in Spain in the summer of 2023, have been seen equipped with CETME-Ls but it remains curious that Spain would provide the rifles as aid to Ukraine. While the rifles had a short service life due to reported reliability issues, with approximately 100,000 manufactured between 1986 and 1991 and since largely replaced by G36s there is likely a substantial number in store and available for transfer.

The CETME-L, despite a decent design on paper, was hampered by quality control issues which led to reliability problems. The rifle’s magazine housing also only allows feeding from steel magazines. While in theory they will feed from STANAG magazines, the magazine housing is optimised for proprietary Spanish magazines (with a different follower and feed lip design) with the magazine seated at more of an angle. The rifles also reportedly favour hotter, higher pressure ammunition. These factors may explain why the CETME-Ls have not been seen in the field with the Border Guards preferring to continue issuing AK-74 pattern rifles to personnel on the front line. The rifles seen in Kyiv may have been drawn from central stores solely for the parade.

We approached both the Spanish Ministry of Defence and the Ukrainian Border Guards for further information but no addition comment has been received. The Spanish Ministry of Defence directed us to an August 2023 press release which detailed Spanish assistance to Ukraine’s Border Guards which does mention “light weapons with their ammunition”.

*Ukrainian Border Guard with CETME-L, August 2023 (DPSU)*

The Spanish press, quoting confidential sources, reported that between 1,000 and 2,000 rifles were transferred. It is also reported that the rifles were never previously issued and that they are being used by rear echelon Ukrainian personnel. This frees up more reliable weapons, like AK-74s and UAR-15s, for frontline use. At the time of publication examination of various DPSU (Ukrainian Border Guard) social media channels doesn’t indicate any signs of further use of CETME-L rifles, even with rear echelon personnel.

Russia’s Rare RPG-16 in Ukraine

One of the rarer Russian anti-armour weapons to surface during the ongoing war in Ukraine is the RPG-16. The RPG-7’s big brother was developed in the late 1960s and entered service in the early 1970s. It was predominantly developed for Russia’s airborne forces, the VDV, but also saw issue to Spetsnaz units.

The RPG-16 is characterised by its larger diameter tube which can fire a 58mm (2.3 inch) PG-16 rocket-propelled grenade. Unlike the RPG-7s munitions the PG-16 slides flush inside the launcher, while this limits the volume and types of warhead the RPG-16’s ammunition can carry it provides improved accuracy and slightly increased range. The PG-16 is a fin-stabilised high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) round with a rocket booster which propels it at a maximum velocity of 350 metres per second. The rocket weighs around 2.1kgs and has a maximum range of 800 metres, though practical engagement range of vehicles is closer to 300 metres. It can penetrate up to 300mm (12 inch) of rolled homogenous armour.

*An RPG-16 seen in a Russian news report, June 2023 (Russia 1)*

The RPG-16 can only fire the PG-16 round and following its adoption in the early 1970s it has been surpassed by other anti-armour weapons which have entered Russian service and by the development of more capable PG-7 series warheads. The launcher weighs 12.4 kg (27 lbs) [compared to the 7 kg (15.4 lb) of the RPG-7] when loaded and is 110cm (43.5 in) long but can be broken down into two parts: the rear tube with venturi and the forward tube and fire control group. Unlike the smaller RPG-7 it has a bipod near the muzzle and a grip area on the fire control group, it does not have a second, rear pistol grip.

A reported 120,000 were produced with manufacture continuing into the late 1980s. It had been thought that the RPG-16 went out of Russian service in the early 2000s but evidently some have been drawn from stores and have been used in Ukraine. The RPG-16 was reportedly used against fixed positions during the Soviet war in Afghanistan and may now be pressed into the same role in Ukraine.

It appears from available imagery that the RPG-16 began to be issued in early 2023. Early March 2023 saw Russian state-news outlet RIA shared a report featuring combatants of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division firing small arms and RPGs in woodland. One of the RPGs fired was an RPG-16.

*Russian combatant firing an RPG-16, December 2023 (via social media)*

In late April, stills from a video of troops said to be with the 98th Guards Airborne Division featured an RPG-16 being fired near Dibrova were shared. I’ve been unable to find the original footage. In June, one of the launchers appeared in a Russia-1 news report featuring Russian forces near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast.

On 26 November, a Russian combatant shared a photograph of an RPG-7 and an RPG-16 next to one another, reportedly taken in a depot or armoury. Two days later on 28 November a short clip of marines from the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade was shared showing an RPG-16 in action, location unknown, possibly near Pavlivka.

A week later, on 3 December a video featuring a pair of Russian combatants from the Otvazhnye (Brave) Group, firing an RPG-7 and an RPG-16 was posted on telegram. The footage was probably filmed in near Kreminna where the unit was reportedly active.

*Russian combatant poses with an RPG-16 and AK-12, January 2024 (via social media)*

On 13 December, a mobilized Russian combatant shared a post on Telegram describing his experiences at the front. He mentions that due to a lack of infantry anti-armour weapons with sufficient range to reach Ukrainian AFVs standing off and firing on their positions his unit began issuing RPG-16s. In late January, two photographs of Russian troops in a trench, location unknown, posed with an RPG-16, and some unrelated RPG-7 munitions.

From the limited imagery available it seems that the RPG-16s have been again issued to largely airborne units, however they have also been seen with Russia’s naval infantry. Exactly why the RPG-16 has returned to service is unclear, as by one Russian combatant suggested, it may be that the greater range offered by the RPG-16 enables engagement of distant targets, another potential reason might be Russia’s desire to use up existing reserve stocks of munitions.

Specifications:

Calibre: 58.3 mm
Length:
– Assembled: 1,104 mm
– Disassembled: 645 mm
Weight:
– Unloaded with optical sight: 10.3kg
– Loaded: 12.4kg
Velocity:
– Initial: 130 m/s
– Maximum: 350 m/s
Effective range: 800 m
Armour Penetration: +300 mm

Bibliography:

Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2014-15, R.D. Jones & L.S. Ness (2014)

58mm PG-16 Rocket, CAT-UXO, (source)

RPG-16 Udar Russian Rocket-Propelled Grenade Launcher, US Army, (source)

Airborne choice: Soviet RPG-16 in Afghanistan, Safar Publishing, (source)

Wheeled Mk19 Mount

A Ukrainian engineer and fabricator, Іван Савельєв/Ivan Saveliev, has designed and built an interesting wheeled mount for the Mk19 automatic grenade launcher. The mount was recently seen in a video posted to TikTok by a member of 4th Rapid Reaction Rubizh Brigade’s 3rd Battalion Svoboda. The video was posted on the 10 November and shows the mount being demonstrated in camp. There’s a long history of Russian machine guns like the Maxim PM1910, SG-43 and DShK having wheeled mounts or carriages. The new mount for the Mk19 could be seen as a descendent of these.

*A Mk19 on the wheeled mount (via social media)*

The first MK19 Mod IIIs arrived from the US in late January 2022, as it looked increasingly likely that Russia would invade. Since then they have proliferated and are widely used by the Ukrainian armed forces.

*A Mk19 on the mount with wheels removed (via social media)*

Saveliev has developed a range of mounts for various support weapons including machine guns, auto-cannons and mortars. He first shared imagery of the wheeled mount for the Mk19 in mid-June posting a photograph showing a Mk19 elevated on one of the mounts. Five months later, on 23 October, Saveliev shared a series of detailed photos of the mount. He noted that the mount could allow the Mk19 to be fired at ‘increased vertical angles’. This is very useful for long range, indirect fire. The M2 heavy machine gun could also be used with the wheeled mount as the mount mimics the mounting points of the M3 tripod, which both the Mk19 and M2 are used with.

*Above & Below: Close-ups of the mount (via social media)*

The mount has a pair of handles at the muzzle end to allow the weapon to be pulled by two men. The elevation of the Mk19 can be adjusted by an elevation wheel which uses a long threaded bar (or worm pinion/screw) to move the mounting arm forward and back, lowering and raising the weapon. In the video posted by members of the 3rd Battalion Svoboda it is suggested that elevations of 60 or more degrees is possible. Windage can be adjusted by a pair of wheels either side of the rear of the mount.

The mount has a pair of wheels with pneumatic tires which can be removed allowing the weapon to be grounded in the mount. However, this looks to be a fairly unstable firing platform due to the narrow base the mount offers compared to the Mk19’s standard tripod. Despite the Mk19’s relatively low recoil the mount would probably have to be well bedded in to achieve accurate fire and prevent it from potentially toppling. There is no mount for the weapon’s belt box.

According to various comments on Saveliev’s posts about the mount individuals from a number of Ukrainian brigades including the 47th Mechanised and 5th Assault brigades are reportedly interested in the mount.

I haven’t yet been able to find any imagery of the mount being used in the field or of a Mk19 being fired from one so its difficult to know how useful it is in battlefield conditions. The major benefit, however, is increasing the Mk19’s portability. Weighing in at 77.6 lbs (35.2 kg) the Mk19 (without the M3 tripod which adds 44 lbs (20 kg)) is heavier than its Russian counter-part, the AGS-17. This makes moving it across broken terrain a difficult task, the wheels might help

Special thanks to Weapons Illustrated who has been tracking this mount and assisted with this video/article.

French Rifles for Ukraine

On 6 November, the French arms manufacturer Verney-Carron, through its defence brand Lebel, announced the signing of a framework contract with Ukrspecexport, a Ukrainian state-owned arms trading company which is part of Ukroboronprom. The contract covers the production of a substantial number of small arms including carbines, precision rifles and 40mm grenade launchers.

The contract is worth 36 million Euros ($38.5 million) and includes 10,000 assault rifles, 2,000 precision rifles and 400 grenade launchers. The contract will need to be funded from Ukrainian and French sources with initial delivery scheduled for early 2024, with delivery to be spread over the next 10 months. The announcement makes no mention of spare parts or support as part of the contract.

The contract will likely see the delivery of Verney-Carron’s VCD15, an AR-15 pattern rifle available in various configurations but chambered in 5.56x45mm or .300 BLK and based on Stoner’s internal gas system. The 2,000 precision rifles are probably Lebel’s VCD10, which was introduced in 2018 and is a precision AR-10 pattern rifle chambered in 7.62x51mm or .260 Remington. The 400 grenade launchers will likely be the compact LP40, a 40x46mm standalone launcher, which weighs 1.3kg, has a removable stock and a folding front pistol grip.

It’s unclear which branch of the Ukrainian Armed forces the small arms will be destined for but they represent a substantial number, enough to equip a brigade or two. In terms of aid France has already provided a wide range of weapon systems and military equipment including self-propelled artillery, armoured personnel carriers, mines, anti-tank guided missiles, small arms, hand grenades and air defence systems.

Russia & Ukraine’s Adapted MT-LBs

The MT-LB tracked artillery tractor has become one of the most recognisable armoured vehicles of the war in Ukraine. These versatile vehicles are used by both sides in huge numbers and while first introduced in the 1970s they continue to be used as both armoured personnel carriers and also as the platform for a plethora of weapon systems ranging from rocket pods to auto-cannons to MT-12 anti-tank guns.

In this article/video we’ll look at two specific MT-LB adaptations; one Russian, one Ukrainian.

*Russian MT-LB adaptation with a 2M-3 turret which was first seen in March 2023 (via Social Media)*

Russia’s Turreted MT-LB

In March 2023, a number of photographs and videos emerged of Russian MT-LBs which had been fitted with a large turret complex over the rear portion of the vehicle. The turrets are naval 2M-3s which mount a pair of 25mm 110-PM autocannons. The first images surfaced at the beginning of March. The strikingly ugly turret quickly led to ridicule on social media and numerous memes mocking the vehicle. Between the 8 and 10 March a series of short videos showing the turret-adapted MT-LBs on the move. One video showed several vehicles in a yard with a large crane, perhaps suggesting they had been off-loaded. The person filming the video notes that the unusual turrets and were apparently ‘sent for defence’. The footage features at least five turreted-MT-LBs, one appearing to also have an adapted front commander’s turret.

Another clip, shared around 10 March, shows a transport train with numerous vehicles loaded, including some Russian Military Police vans. Two (possibly four) of the adapted MT-LBs can be seen. Similarly, another clip showing the vehicles in transit through an urban area features one perhaps two adapted-MT-LBs.

*Other examples of Russian MT-LB adaptations with 2M-3 turrets (via Social Media)*

Since the early spring there have been no sightings of the vehicles but in late May a video and several photos were shared featuring a Russian combatant riding in the turret of one of the adapted MT-LBs, the anti-aircraft style style sight can be seen in the video and one of the photographs.

Russia is likely making use of turrets that have been in storage since the vessels they were mounted on were decommissioned. Their is probably still an ample supply of ammunition for the 25mm autocannons. The mount has -12° to +85° elevation and 360° rotation giving it a good field of fire for use against ground targets.

Just what role Russia envisioned for the turreted MT-LBs is still unclear. They could be used in direct fire roles perhaps as support guns which can help plug gaps in defensive lines with suppressive fire. Or perhaps as mobile anti-aircraft vehicles for taking on drones but their limited manual targeting would mean they would struggle to be a match for even slow moving drones. Other potential uses might be as assault guns or as a more heavily armed vehicle for internal security duties protecting supply lines from Ukrainian partisans.

*Ukrainian MT-LBu adaptation with a KPV heavy machine gun remote weapon system (via Social Media)*

Ukraine’s MT-LB Refits

While many of both sides’ MT-LB adaptations have focused on simply mounting a weapon system to the rear deck or where the commander’s original PKT mount was, a recent Ukrainian refit has gone much further. A video was shared by a Ukrainian MT-LB crewmember which showed six vehicles all refit to a similar configuration. It appears that additional armour has been added to the sides and rear of the vehicle in an effort to provide additional protection to the lightly armoured MT-LB. [Correction: the vehicle has 7 road-wheels indicating the adaptation is likely based on an MT-LBu variant. These have been described as BMP-1LBs.] The vehicles also have new storage baskets, smoke-grenade launchers and a new remote weapon mount controlled from inside the MT-LB. A photograph of the front of the mount shows that it mounts a single 14.5x114mm KPVT machine gun, remotely fired and aimed using an electro-optics module positioned to the left side of the gun. The weapon and optics are protected by a curved gun shield, the cuts in the shield suggest that the weapon’s range of elevation is considerable.

*Russian MT-LB adaptation with twin DShk mount on the original PKT turret (via Social Media)*

These vehicles are are just two examples of MT-LBs in Ukraine adapted with ad-hoc weapon mounts. There are dozens of other examples of up-gunned MT-LBs deployed by both sides. Other commonly seen adaptations include fitting ZU-23-2 anti-aircaft mounts to MT-LBs

In February 2023, Ukrainian troops shared a video of a Russian MT-LB captured near Vuhledar, which had been fitted with a 2M-7 naval turret mounting a pair of 14.5mm KPV heavy machine guns. Similar vehicles appeared in photographs showing several MT-LBs with ad-hoc adaptations which included one vehicle with the same, as well as other vehicles with other dual and single gun mounts. One can be seen mounted with a single DShK on a tall, exposed pintle mount.

In May, an MT-LB was sighted with a twin DShK mount. Similarly, another MT-LB fitted with a twin DShK mount on top of the existing PKT turret was shared on 10 June, it had also been adapted by adding track and boxes as appliqué armour. Also in June, a photograph of a pair of MT-LBs equipped with A-22 140mm multiple rocket launch systems was shared on Telegram.

With Ukraine forming new brigades and both sides suffering considerable armoured vehicle losses the ubiquitous MT-LB, while lightly armoured, offers one of the best available platforms for mounting additional or role-specific weapons.

Sweden’s KSP-58 Machine Guns In Ukraine

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February we’ve seen a number of FN MAG variants appear in use with Ukrainian forces. By far the most common appears to be the US M240 series. However, in recent months we’ve also seen a number of Swedish KSP-58s appear in imagery from the field.

Sweden has long supported the Ukrainian war effort providing a shipment of 5,000 Pansarskott m/86 anti-armour weapons (perhaps better known as the AT4) back in late February. The transfer of an additional batch of 5,000 m/86s was announced on 2 June. Most recently on 30 June it was reported that Sweden would provide a fresh batch of light anti-armour weapons and also machine guns as part of a transfer worth $49 million. When delivery of this aid was made is unconfirmed but the KSP-58s are reported to have been in theatre possibly as early as July – August.

While the type of machine gun was not confirmed, since the beginning of September we’ve seen imagery of a number of KSP-58 GPMGs appear in theatre. Easily identified by their wooden stocks, grey-green-coloured receiver finish and enclosed front sight. Sweden was one of the earliest adopters of the FN MAG and the Kulspruta 58 or KSP-58 entered service with the Swedish armed forces in the late 1950s and was originally chambered in the 6.5×55mm Swedish round. The KSP-58B was introduced following the adoption of 7.62x51mm. The guns were made under license from FN at the Carl Gustav Stads rifle factory in Eskilstuna.

*A KSP-58B in use with Ukrainian troops c. September 2022 (via social media)*

These have been seen in the hands of International Legion units and also regular Ukrainian Army units centred around Mykolaiv and Kherson. All the the examples of the weapon sighted appear to be KSP-58Bs, none of the guns seen have the Picatinny rails seen in the KSP-58F.

Speaking to Kaiser [frontline_view_kaiser] a German volunteer with the Ukrainian Army, he said his unit encountered a “a brand-new, never used KSP with original factory delivered Box and all accessories untouched”. His colleague Yuri [nucking_futs_yuri] has shared some videos filmed in late-August, during a training session he ran on FN MAG variants for various Ukrainian units. Yuri said their were about 20 guns on the range during the training session, with the majority being KSP-58s. Yuri shared a video in mid-September firing a through a KSP-58B, from the hip, filmed after the training session had been completed.

*Yuri with a KSP-58B c. September 2022 (nucking_futs_yuri)*

While we can’t confirm that the KSP-58s came directly from Sweden it seems likely. Another potential origin for the weapons may be the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Sweden gifted an unconfirmed number of KSP-58s to the Baltic States in the 1990s. Today, the guns remain in service with the Latvian Army and National Guard, the Estonian Army and Estonian Defence League and the Lithuanian Army and National Defence Volunteer Force. Both Estonia and Lithuania began searching for a replacement for the KSP-58 in mid-2021. Given the Baltic states’ support for Ukraine the guns may potentially have originated from there, rather than Sweden itself. We have already seen the Baltic States have transferred former Swedish equipment including the PV-1110 recoilless anti-tank gun which were given to the Baltic states in the early 1990s.

It remains to be seen if we’ll see more of the KSP-58s in the field but in future articles/videos we’ll look at other FN MAG variants are in use in Ukraine.

Update 16/1/24: A maritime element of Ukraine’s Border Guards shared photos of them familiarising with what appears to be a KSP-58.

Some good photos of what appears to be a Swedish FN-MAG (KSP-58) in use with the Ukrainian Border Guards' maritime element.

More on KSP-58s in Ukraine here: https://t.co/QxjiTostfl #Ukraine #UkraineWar #UkraineRussiaWar️️ #SALW pic.twitter.com/X6pmvZbwvk
— Matthew Moss | Historical Firearms (@historicfirearm) January 16, 2024

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Bibliography:

Thank you to Kaiser and Yuri for their input – definitely check them out on their social media!

Kulspruta 58, Forsvarsmakten, (source)

KSP-58, Soldf.com, (source)

Sweden to boost military aid to Ukraine, Politico, 29 Aug. 2022, (source)

Sweden to send military aid to Ukraine, Reuters, 27 Feb. 2022, (source)

Sweden assists Ukraine with the Robot 17, SVt.se, 2 June 2022, (source)

Sweden to send more anti-tank weapons and machine guns to Ukraine, Reuters, 30 June 2022, (source)

Estonia to acquire new weapons for EDF, Defense League, ERR, 18 Nov. 2022, (source)

Lithuania buys machine guns for EUR 34 million, Defence 24, 20 Aug. 2022, (source)