Tag: Mines

3D Printed Anti-Personnel Mines

In this article/video we’ll examine an an interesting and very simple 3D printed anti-personnel mine developed by the Ukrainians. The mines are similar in purpose and size to the Russian PFM-1, the so-called ‘Butterfly’ mines. However, their shape and form factor is similar to that of the larger PMN-4, but they are significantly simpler.

3D printed mine found in the field (via social media)

The 3D printed mine’s explosive filling is said to be around 30g, with an overall weight of 55g. The mine is made up of a two-part outer shell printed in PLA, or another similar plastic. The two pieces screw together and a layer of plastic explosive is in the bottom half of the shell along with a percussion initiator of some sort. The top half of the mine has a small  metal Philips-head screw protruding down through the top, this acts as a striker for the initiator. There is a tube protruding up from the lower half of the mine, printed as part of the body, which likely guides the screw and holds the initiator.

The mine appears to work along the principle of when stepped on the outer shell breaks and compacts allowing the screw to strike the initiator, detonating the mine.

An illustration of the mine’s layout and components (Alexis Midy/Midy Infographie)

The design is extremely simple and cost effective to produce, requiring only the simplest 3D printer, a screw and an initiator and explosive.

The first sighting of the mines I’ve been able to find was in a telegram post by a Russian sapper. In the post, on 6 October, he shared several photos of the mines found in the field and warned that Ukrainian drones are dropping them in the Kursk and Belgorod regions. Another photo of one of the mines was shared by another Russian combatant on 8 October.

A Russian telegram channel, enginner25, shared post showing multiple images of the mines and a video showing the internals.

3D printed mine opened to show explosive filling (via social media)

In another photo we can see that the mines are apparently dropped from plastic tubes suspended below drones. The photo only shows the top of the tube but it’s clear that a number of tubes are carrying a significant number of mines. The release mechanism for the lids of the carrier tubes appears to use something like 3mm Visco fuze, commonly used with fireworks, or igniter cord. Once initiated the fuze/cord burns away and releases the mines with the drone scattering them as it flies over an area.

The design of the mine is extremely simple but appears to be potentially quite effective, relying on the brittleness of the 3D printed shell to work. The mines seem to have been engineered to be quickly produced at scale rather than to make them undetectable to Russian sappers. However, if a non-metallic striker replaced the screw the mines would be even more difficult to detect.

Assorted 3D printed mines (via social media)

While not the first 3D printed explosive device to emerge from the fighting in Ukraine, this mine is certainly one of the smallest and simplest. How widespread their deployment is, is still unclear but they seem they would be a useful part of Ukraine’s drone-deployed mine interdiction efforts behind Russian lines.

Thank you to Roy for drawing my attention to these mines.

Update 22/12/24: A new Russian video showing the internals of the mine and giving a better look at the percussion initiator (source).

Update 5/7/25: A Ukrainian video showing the testing of a 3D printed mine.

https://twitter.com/GrandpaRoy2/status/1941188821229658422

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Heavy Drone Bombers Dropping Anti-Tank Mines

Drone warfare in Ukraine is one of the war’s most rapidly evolving elements with considerable innovation and improvisation. In recent weeks several videos have been shared showing large drones dropping TM-62 anti-tank mines.

The first video shared on 3 September showed how a mine could be carried and released by a large six-rotor drone. The TM-62M is seen loaded into a cradle tray which is then remotely triggered causing the floor plate to hinge and release the mine. The video also shows how the TM-62 is fuzed with a UZRG-pattern hand grenade fuze, pushed directly into the mine’s explosive through a hole cut in the side of its casing.

The TM-62M is a high-explosive blast landmine designed to immobilise or destroy vehicles. The mine is packed with 7.5kg (17lbs) of explosive and is normally centrally fuzed by a pressure fuze. The TM-62M is a significant payload for a bomber drone and when dropped they have significant blast effect.

A subsequent video, shared on 6 September, shows a series of clips filmed by the bomber drone’s camera showing the TM-62 being dropped on numerous targets. The mines in this video have been significantly adapted with a stabilising tail added. The tail appears to be made up of a length of PVC pipe and a large water battle with its base cut off. The tail appears to be quite effective especially given the mine’s considerable weight and poor aerodynamics. It is also notable that the fuzing system appears to be different in the second video. Rather than a hand grenade fuze it appears that a larger fuze has been used, positioned next to the stabilising tail.

With the tail and its cut down water bottle its unlikely the release system for this munition is the same as that seen in the first video. A system which would allow for a smooth release and not snag the tail assembly would be needed. In several of the clips in the second video a strap swings past the drone’s camera perhaps suggesting there is a sling system in use.

A subsequent photograph shared on social media shows one of the mines in much better resolution. The tail is indeed made from PVC piping and a water bottle and the fuze appears to be vane-armed. The makers also have a sense of humour likening the odd-looking munition to the ‘USS Enterprise’ from Star Trek, they’ve written ‘USS Enterprise NCC-0001’ on the forward section of the mine.

At the same time as the photograph a number of additional videos showing the TM-62 based bombs being dropped were shared. These videos were originally shared towards the end of August and show a series of successful munition drops.

We are seeing a trend towards more sophisticated and more capable drone bombers which can carry either greater numbers of smaller bombs or larger singular bombs like the TM-62 munition.

Update – 1/10/23

The K-2 drone team with the 54th Brigade has shared footage of one of their drones dropping TM-62s mines on a Russian checkpoint and storage position. The drone appears to drop several unadapted TM-62s, though the lag time between landing and detonation would indicate they are not equipped with an impact fuze but perhaps a grenade fuze as seen in the initial videos featuring TM-62s. The resolution of the thermal cameras does not make it possible to identify the method of fuzing.

Note the falling TM-62 (with tape) and the swinging drop tray (K-2)

The release system appears to consist of a tray which holds the mine which is suspended by straps which are released to drop the munition. The tray can be seen swinging beneath the drone after one of the drops. The munitions appear to have tape around them, the reason for this is unclear, perhaps protecting the fuze system.

Update – 5/1/24: A video compilation showing numerous drops of TM-62s was shared on 5 January 2024. It begins with a demonstration of a light weight drop tray being released. The tray appears to be made from a metal grill (perhaps from an oven or an animal cage). The compilation shows mines being dropped without tail assemblies like those seen in earlier videos. Their are also visible puffs of gases/smoke from the mine’s fuze being triggered as it descends.

Update – 11/1/24:

Update -17/1/24: Further footage of TM-62 pattern mines being dropped from drones. Note a tail stabiliser is not used.

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Bibliography:

TM-62M Landmine, CAT-UXO, (source)

Fuzes, CAT-UXO, (source)

French HPD2A2 Mines in Ukraine

Earlier this week (7 November) Alexander Borodai, the former leader of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic now a member of the Russian Duma for the separatist region, was seen in a video showing a near miss with a French HPD 2A2 anti-vehicle mine. The video, believed to have been filmed south of Kherson, showed the lead vehicle of Borodai’s convoy damaged by a mine, while another mine was seen next to his vehicle. The lead vehicle appears to be badly damaged with the front of the vehicle seemingly taking the brunt. If the vehicles was damaged by a HPD 2A2 it is interesting that the 4×4 vehicle was able to set off the mine which is designed to be triggered by heavier armoured vehicles, though some sources state movement of even smaller metal objects near by can trigger the mine. Similary Borodai is lucky not to have triggered the mine’s anti-tamper system.

The mine is clearly identifiable as a French HPD-2A2 with the lot number 01-BT-19. Various sources suggest around 400,000 of the HPD series of mines have been produced and they’re in service with the French, Norwegian, Belgian and Swiss armed forces. From Borodai’s video we can see the mine has a serial number of ‘9131229‘. Another example photographed in early October has the partial serial number ‘91296..’ visible. Both mines are from the same lot and the end digits seem to denote year of manufacture – 2019.

Russian sources suggest the mines have been in theatre since August but the first images of the mines were shared in early July, pictured in the back of a Ukrainian van with German DM-22 off-route mines and DM-31s. Some video was released by a Ukrainian explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officer in July which is claimed to show a Russian vehicle destroyed by one of the HPD-2A2 mines.

The HPD family of mines (which includes the HPD 1, 2 and 3) began to be developed in the early 1980s by Thomson-CSF and Daimler-Chrysler Aerospac. The HPD2 (or MI AC HPD F2 in French service) was introduced in 1988. The mines use a 3.3kg charge made up of an RDX/TNT mix to create an explosively formed penetrator using the Misznay–Schardin effect. The mines are said to be able to penetrate armour between 100 to 150mm thick. The mines have a 10 minute arming delay once set and can be active for up to 30 day before they deactivate themselves. Because the mine can be triggered by the electromagnetic field of a metal detector it has been said that this contravenes the Geneva Convention’s Protocol II (May 3, 1996).

The HPD-2 is made up of two sections: a fuze assembly with a magnetic influence sensor and a two battery power supply, the self-neutralising system and the arming mechanism and the mine’s explosive charge. It reportedly has an anti-handling device sensitive to motion and the signals produced by metal detectors. The mine is detonated when the seismic sensor reacts to vibrations made by passing vehicles and a magnetic sensor is activated. The magnetic sensor uses variation in the earth’s magnetic field caused by the proximity of a vehicle’s large metal mass. Sources suggest the magnetic sensors is triggered by vehicles over 8 tons.

While there has been no official confirmation the mines are believed to have been provided by France as part of their military aid to Ukraine which has also included VAB armoured vehicles, Mistral short range air defence systems and anti-tank guided missile systems including MILAN and Javelin.

We’ve previously examined the German DM22, Estonian PK-14 and Russian PTKM-1R mines in use in Ukraine.

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Bibliography:

HPD-2 Landmine, CAT-UXO, (source)

MI AC HPD F2 Landmine, Fenix Insight, (source)

HPD Mine, Lexpev.nl, (source)

HPD Mines, Rufor.org, (source)

MI ACH 88, RMS, (source)

State Duma deputy’s security car blows up on French HPD anti-tank mine in Ukraine’s Kherson region, EuroWeekly, (source)

Arms For Ukraine: French Weapons Deliveries To Kyiv, Oryx, (source)

Cold War Weapons: The Off-Route Mine

During the Cold War NATO was understandably interested in capable anti-armour weapons. In this video/article we will examine the Off-Route Mine which features in footage from several British Army training films. They show a team of Royal Engineers setting up an L14A1 off-route mine ready to ambush attacking Soviet tanks.

Unlike a conventional mine which detonated vertically when a vehicle drove over it, the Off-Route Mine would be tripped by a breakwire set across a vehicles likely path. When the wire was tripped or broken the mine’s charge would be electrically detonated and the blast would project horizontally.

An Off-Route Mine in position (IWM)

What the British termed the L14A1 was developed in the early 1970s by France’s state arsenals. In French service it was known as the ‘Mine Anti char à action horizontale Modèle F1′ (or MI AC AH F1). It was manufactured throughout the 1970s and 80s by GIAT Industries.

The mine was essentially an electrically fired shape charge, it used the Misznay-Schardin effect rather than the Monroe effect. The former relies on a shallower, concave shape charge, which has a copper cone that is super heated by the explosion and fired out towards the target. This gave it the ability to project its cone further and removed the need for it to detonate in contact with the target vehicle. 

An illustration of how the Off-Route Mine works from a British Army manual

The mine had an effective range of between 70 to 80 metres and according to the 1977 French manual the projectile created by the detonation could travel up to 6km. In terms of the mine’s effectiveness the same manual states that 40m was the optimal range but no closer than 2m.

The manual also notes that “the slightest obstacle in the trajectory of the projectile (such as earth or shrubs) considerably reduces performance.” The diagram below from a 1977 French Army manual shows the effect of the mine on 70mm of armour at 40m, with 0-degrees of angle.

Effect diagram from 1977 French Army manual

When detonated the mine could throw fragments in a radius of 100m and could throw armour shards from a successful strike up to 200m from the target. The British mines came in the L27A1 kit which included a pair of the L14A1 off-route mines as well as instructions, the break wires, a night sighting tool, and an adjustable stand for mounting.

The mine’s electorally-powered detonator was powered by D cell batteries, which Sappers complained had to be frequently changed. The mine itself weighed 12kg and was packed with just over 6kg of Hexolite explosive. There was also a training version, the L28A1, which fired a paint-filled sponge to mark the side of the vehicle and confirm a hit. 

A Sapper setting up an Off-Route Mine (IWM)

The Miacah F1 was removed from French service in 2001. An improved version, the F2, was manufactured in 1996 and used by the French until the mines were withdrawn in 2004 due to corrosion. While some mines may have remained in stores, as some have been seen as late as 2016, they contravened the 1997 Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel mines because the break wire could in theory be tripped by a human rather than a vehicle.

It was replaced in British service by the ARGES off-round Anti-Tank Mine which fired a modified 94mm rocket with a tandem HEAT warhead. In 1997 it was reported that 4870 Off-Route mines were held by British Army stores, in line with the Ottawa Treaty this had been reduced to 0 by 1999.

If you enjoyed this video and article please consider supporting our work here. We have some great perks available for Patreon Supporters – including custom stickers and early access to videos! Thank you for your support!

Bibliography:

Landmine Monitor Report, 2004, Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, (source)
Landmine Monitor Report, 2000, Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, (source)
CNEMA Report, 2000 (source)
British Army User Handbook, Mine Anti-Tank Kit L27A1 (Off Route Mine), 1980
French Army MIACAH F1 Manual, 1977

Footage:

Fighting In Woods, British Army training film, 1982, (held by the IWM, DRA 1472)
Fighting In Villages, British Army training film, 1979, (held by the IWM, DRA 1401)